Alland: The Artistic Animal / Author\u27s Response and Reviewer\u27s Reply by Alland, Alexander & Kaplan, Flora S.
Studies in Visual Communication 
Volume 6 
Issue 2 Summer 1980 Article 12 
1980 
Alland: The Artistic Animal / Author's Response and Reviewer's 
Reply 
Alexander Alland 
Flora S. Kaplan 
Recommended Citation 
Alland, A., & Kaplan, F. S. (1980). Alland: The Artistic Animal / Author's Response and Reviewer's Reply. 6 
(2), 93-96. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/svc/vol6/iss2/12 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/svc/vol6/iss2/12 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Alland: The Artistic Animal / Author's Response and Reviewer's Reply 
This reviews and discussion is available in Studies in Visual Communication: https://repository.upenn.edu/svc/vol6/
iss2/12 
Reviews and Discussion 
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Alland. The Artistic Animal: An Inquiry into the 
Biological Roots of Art. 
Author's Response 
FloraS. Kaplan's review of my book The Artistic Animal in 
Studies [5(2):132-135] is so full of distortions, mis-
readings, and errors that I cannot let it go unanswered. It 
should be as ludicrous to others as it is painful to me to 
equate my work on art with sociobiology, yet I stand ac-
cused by Professor Kaplan of having written a 
sociobiological explanation of artistic behavior. Clearly 
Professor Kaplan is unable to distinguish between at-
tempts to investigate the biological roots of specific cul-
tural behaviors and sociobiology, which offers biological 
explanations not only of origins but of differences in be-
havior among contemporary individuals and social 
groups. Furthermore, sociobiologists claim to find spe-
cific continuities between what they pretend is geneti-
cally based instinctive behavior in lower animals and 
analogous behavior in humans. In my book I am careful to 
distinguish between the behavior of lower animals as it 
might relate to the emergence of artistic behavior in hu-
mans and artistic behavior per se. For example, on page 
24 I say: "Not even a hint of it [artistic behavior] occurs in 
the natural behavior of other species." And, as I point out, 
my major argument about the emergence of art as a 
uniquely human capacity is that in the biological sense 
artistic behavior is not adaptive and thus not a product of 
selection. Instead I suggest that it is an artifact of other 
adaptive traits, some of which occur in nonhumans. 
Although I list a series of traits that are undoubtedly 
adaptive in any environment for most if not all primates 
(play and exploratory behavior, fine-grain perceptual dis-
crimination and good memory storage, sensitivity to cer-
tain kinds of form or gestalts in the environment), I reserve 
one trait for the human species alone: This is what I call 
transformation-representation. It is based on the ability of 
humans to symbol and use metaphor, but its content is 
purely cultural. Without this trait art as such cannot exist, 
and it is for this reason that it is useless to talk about 
artistic behavior in lower animals. As I say in the book, "It 
is for these reasons that art, as part of culture, can only be 
understood from the point of view of culture. If art has a 
strong biological base, that base is manifested only in 
the context of a particular history. Art does not stand 
alone as a biological process, because one of its most 
important aspects, transformation-representation, takes 
its content from the specific moment. Art and trans-
formation-representation are only realizable historically" 
(pp. 120-121). 
1 do not believe nor do I claim that artistic behavior is in 
any way instinctive. I do believe that art as part of sym-
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bolic behavior of a special and uniquely human kind has 
its roots in human evolutipn. I state clearly in the book, 
and in several places, that the art of any particular culture 
at any particular historical period is purely a cultural 
question. My statement on page xi that "genetic poten-
tialities, built into our brains, can generate artistic beh-av-
ior in the sense of both creation and appreciation" has 
been seized upon by Kaplan and can only be misun-
derstood when quoted out of context, for I go on to say in 
the next sentence: "This exclusively human pattern de-
termines an infinite space within which individual creativ-
ity can achieve its full expression." 
I never extrapolate from, nor do I believe that one can 
extrapolate from, a hereditary predisposition "to genes 
and R-om genes to specific behavior as complex and var-
ied as expressive behavior in the visual arts, music, 
dance, theatre, and ritual" (Kaplan 1977:132). Her misun-
derstanding of my point of view is blatant when she cites 
pages 32 and 63 'of my book as evidence for the above 
interpretation. On page 32, I stress that lower animals that 
either respond to form (not art) or play with form are in no 
way engaging in artistic behavior. On that page I say in 
an italicized sentence, "painting apes are not artists." 
Kaplan also questions my discussion of ape "painting" 
on the ground that apes are not our ancestors (which, of 
course, they are not) and because their painting may 
simply result from pleasurable motor activities. I agree 
that it is dangerous to extrapolate from apes to humans, 
but as close genetic relatives they can tell us something 
about primate capacities in general, especially when 
these are shared capacities. As for pleasure in motor 
activity, I can only agree that this is probably the major, if 
not the only, reason apes "paint," but one ingredient of 
artisitic pleasure is just that: motor pleasure. Clearly, 
however, the illustration in my book of Nim Chimpsky's 
copy of a square, a circle, and a triangle is more than 
simple motor pleasure, if less than art. 
On page 63 of The Artistic Animal my discussion of 
brain function refers specifically to possible right- versus 
left-hemisphere control of visual art and music. I am sur-
prised that Kaplan finds these suggestions unsupported 
by the evidence, since there is a large literature on 
lateral ization. I also cite Howard Gardner's book The 
Shattered Mind (Knopf, 1975) to indicate certain differ-
ences between human linguistic behavior which is trans-
formative and communication (not language) in lower 
animals. Gardner points out that damage to the right 
hemisphere may leave ordinary syntax and vocabulary 
intact but disturb the ability of humans to use and under-
stand metaphor. Furthermore, while I do not attempt to 
locate artistic behavior in a specific part of the brain 
(I fully agree with Kaplan that such behavior is complex 
and must be diffuse), we do know that certain perceptual 
inputs (such as line angles) are decoded not only in par-
ticular regions of the brain, but in specific cells! Fine-
grain perceptual discrimination is one of the pre-
94 studies in Visual Communication 
adaptations for artistic behavior that I cite in my book, 
and this kind of perception is closely linked to the kind of 
specific cell activity noted here. 
Professor Kaplan suffers from that disease of schol-
arship known as reference mongering. She cites a long 
string of references to indicate that "The present study of 
hominid evolution encompasses a series of competing 
models and interpretations based on the same fossil rec-
ord: seed-eaters as opposed to hunters as opposed to 
hunters and scavengers" (Kaplan 1977:132). I do not deny 
the complex issues Kaplan raises, but they have abso-
lutely nothing to do with the arguments in my book, since 
I make no attempt to discuss the stages of human evolu-
tion as they apply to the emergence of art. Rather I point 
out that, whatever the route taken, the traits that are pre-
adaptations for artistic behavior must have occurred for 
human evolution to have occurred as it did, and for art to 
have emerged as a specifically human trait. The adapta-
tions I dwell on fit a// the models of human evolution, and 
they are not in any way related to specific stages of 
that evolution. 
The goals of anthropology are to explain both the 
similarities and differences that occur among human 
groups. Most anthropologists concentrate on the differ-
ences. My book, in the tradition of searching for what is 
known as the psychic unity of humankind, attempts to 
understand the basis for one important area of similarity: 
the capacity for artistic behavior. Therefore, it is outra-
geous to accuse me of ignoring differences: "These kinds 
of differences and much ethnographic detail are lost in 
studies which focus on the underlying similarities" (Kap-
lan 1977:133). Who can deny this statement? But a study 
of differences, as wide as they are and as important as 
they are (as I myself point out), will never yield informa-
tion on what we have in common as a species. Kaplan 
demands that I play the wrong game according to her 
rules! 
The same problem arises when Kaplan accuses me of 
circular reasoning. "'Good form' produces an aesthetic 
response in 'sensitive individuals.'" This is one of the many 
examples of circular reasoning found in the book: aesthe-
tic response is defined by the very individuals whore-
spond to aesthetics, and good form is later distinguished 
from bad form by these same sensitive individuals" (Kap-
lan 1977:134). My statement is based on empirical find-
ings and not on definitions. When random subjects in 
different cultures are asked to make aesthetic judgments 
from the same sample of art, there is high agreement 
within cultures but no significant agreement between cul-
tures. When the same samples are shown to people in-
terested and involved in art, the agreement becomes 
significant between cultures even when the subjects 
have no familiarity with the art used in the experiment. 
What we are apparently getting at here is response to 
"good form," an element (not the only one; I speak of 
convention and structure as well) in art appreciation. 
In an attempt to bury me under her own erudition Kap-
lan indulges in a long exegesis of an erased de Kooning 
by Robert Rauschenberg and criticizes my equating it 
with subway graffiti. Everything she says about the Rau-
schenberg work is true. It does, as she states, have its art 
history. Kaplan is also correct when she points out that 
subway graffiti are not action paintings, at least not in the 
sense that the term has meaning in recent modern art. But 
in all that rhetoric Kaplan totally loses sight of the simple 
point I was trying to make in an introductory chapter. The 
point of Chapter I in The Artistic Animal is merely to con-
vince those who need convincing that the net of art is 
spread wide and goes beyond what many laymen con-
sider art to be. When I said that subway graffiti are an 
example of life imitating art (a very small point in the 
book, by the way), I meant that the erased de Kooning 
and erased subway graffiti share certain formal elements 
that exist apart from art history and interpretation. The 
more one becomes open to art in life, the more one can 
make the transformations necessary to (in a real sense) 
create one's own art. Wrapped buildings (wrapped in the 
winter to keep construction workers out of the cold) re-
mind me of Cristo's work, even though I know (but how 
many laymen know?) that all of Cristo's wrappings have 
both aesthetic and political points to make. The whole 
nature of the game of art is such that formally similar 
phenomena can produce transformative reverberations of 
an aesthetic sort when connections are made between 
them. For me, at least, to say that "life imitates art" is to 
say that art often provides a means for seeing the mun-
dane in new, exciting, and aesthetic ways. 
Also, for the record, when I say that subway graffiti are 
action paintings, I mean this in the same sense as their 
artists do: they tell me that they enjoy seeing their graffiti 
speed through the city. The actual graffiti are planned in 
advance, but their artistic life is enhanced by the motion 
of the subway cars that bear them. 
Alexander AI land 
Reviewer's Reply 
Let me begin my reply to Alland's emotional and wild-
swinging attacks in response to my review of his book, 
The Artistic Animal, by saying that such attacks do not 
elevate either the discussion or his stature. I might add 
that it is a little difficult, and even humorous, to take seri-
ously his attempt, in a parting attack, to strike a humble 
pose. He is, after all, the author who has attempted to 
give us an illustrated, worldwide, cross-cultural, and evo-
lutionary theory of the origins of art in some 140 pages. 
Reviews and Discussion 
I can appreciate AI land's distress if he thinks he is 
being classed as a sociobiologist. He obviously sees 
himself on the side of culture, and as a humanist. The 
review referred only to the book's potential for extending 
the "sociobiological debate," into areas of expressive cul-
ture. Nowhere in the review did I suggest that AI land 
consciously supports sociobiology. What is obvious, like 
it or not, is that the book itself will be identified, certainly 
in the public mind, with a sociobiological approach, pre-
senting as it does an organic, genetic, and evolutionary 
basis for the origins of art. Here I would remind readers 
that the subtitle of this popular paperback is An Inquiry 
into the Biological Roots of Art. Note, too, that the cover 
illustration is a painter's palette with the head of a 
"gorilla" (quotes mine) substituted at one end for a color, 
as a kind of subtle visual surprise. It is a surprise which 
shows very graphically the kind of linkage which I have 
pointed to in my review, and which is pointed at the pub-
lic. AI land could have indicated in his reply that he had, 
perhaps, argued with his publishers and regretted any 
confusion caused by the subtitle and choice of cover, but 
he does not. The association set in motion by the book's 
title, subtitle, and cover are carried forward immediately 
in the opening paragraph of the preface, which asserts 
the existence of "genetic potentialities, built into our 
brains" (regardless of the stated "infinite space" they are 
supposed to create) (p. xi). 
Alland makes a distinction between investigating the 
biological roots of specific cultural behaviors and biolog-
ical explanations by sociobiologists of origins and differ-
ences among contemporary individuals and social 
groups; and he oversimplifies the sociobiological ap-
proach, which does not exclude culture. In fact, if we 
listen to Wilson's remarks in the course of a debate on 
sociobiology with Marvin Harris, much of what he says is 
compatible with what AI land is saying through much of 
his book. That is not to say this makes AI land a 
sociobiologist; it simply means that his book and its im-
plications lend support to this approach. 
Wilson sees sociobiology as concerned with social 
behavior; although "it is not a specific theory about 
human behavior ... it allows for any of a wide array of 
possibilities" (The New York Times:18E, p. 3). Both Wilson 
and Harris agree, generally, that human behavior is on a 
genetic leash. It appears in their discussion that it is 
Harris, the anthropologist, who wishes to focus on the 
study of differences and Wilson, the sociobiologist, who 
is interested in similarities. But this is as much a matter of 
personal choice as epistemology, not inherent in the re-
spective disciplines. 
Wilson freely admits that from the biological point of 
view "the human being is unique; that culture is overrid-
ing, and that therefor~ with reference to sociobiological 
theory the human species is a wild card," and he leaves 
the question open to empirical investigation. What is in-
teresting about Wilson's remarks in this debate are his 
convictions about the hard understructure in the form of 
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emotional predisposition in learning rules that channel 
cultural evolution and make biological investigation well 
worthwhile. 
Wilson feels that human beings are on a dual track of 
evolution with their fastest track being cultural evolution; 
and yet they have gotten up to this point by conventional 
genetic evolution. These statements by the leading pro-
ponent of sociobiology, including his emphasis on the 
existence of "programmed learning rules" and "under-
structure," do not seem wildly apart from All and's blend of 
biology and culture, structure, and genetic blueprints. 
Even Harris, not noted for taking mild positions, sees the 
interrelationship between their differences mainly in 
terms of emphasis and the focus they would give to re-
search efforts. 
I have simply called attention to the implications con-
tained in The Artistic Animal and made them explicit. It 
seems AI land is shocked by this. I would urge him then to 
reread his book as carefully as I have, several times, and 
to consider the implications of what he writes before re-
lease and not complain about them afterward. AI land 
wants to have it both ways, and all ways: biology and 
culture-separate but together, rooted but apart, adap-
tive but then nonadaptive. Is it that AI land means to say 
that art is symbolic behavior? 
The review I wrote focused on the book as written, not 
on the intent of the author. I was careful to point out on the 
very first page that the reader's view of the book will 
"depend on your theoretical preference for dealing with 
macroanalysis or microanalysis, for similarities or differ-
ences in human behavior" (p. 132). Alland declares I 
wanted him to write it my way, to have been concerned 
with differences, not similarities. Not so. The main prob-
lems with this book come from contradictory concepts 
and circular definitions that preclude meaningful mac-
roanalysis. True, AI land includes culture, history, ecology, 
game theory, biology, and genetics in the origins of art. 
But in not telling us what, where, how, and why-in in-
cluding everything so as not to be found wanting in 
anything-AIIand ends by giving us nothing to measure, 
weigh, or test empirically or logically. My criticisms are 
directed not to the fact that he fails to deal with "differ-
ences" but that he does not enable us to understand 
much about "similarities" either. 
AI land misinterprets the seriousness with which I 
examined his biological claims for art, calling it "refer-
ence mongering," a presumably perjorative description. 
However, in his response he hastens to assure everyone 
that he has read most of the same sources. It seems 
obvious in this context that the converse of such "monger-
ing" is nonmongering, or sloppy scholarship. I gave only 
a few examples of the latter from his book in my review (p. 
135). I did not dwell on them since the book was directed 
to a general audience. Nonetheless, the half-references 
and nonreferencing of quotes and sources, and the ab-
sence of translations of foreign-language passages, will 
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be frustrating for those who read his book. Indeed, it is 
nearly impossible to tell what AI land has read and used 
in the book from the inadequate bibliography provided, 
sparsity of notes, and other such problems. His response 
to my review will be useful for filling these gaps in the 
book. 
In discussing my remarks on the graffiti/de Kooning-
Rauschenberg analogy, AI land again ~sures us that he 
has read all the same sources and knows the same 
things I do. In fact he supports my points about graffiti 
and their makers in all regards except in the conclusions 
drawn. He then attempts to extend the discussion in his 
response to the review by saying it is the "formal princi-
ples" which underlie both the erased subway car and the 
erased de Kooning drawing that are alike. Here he re-
peats his original errors in a new form. And I confess I am 
at a loss even to guess what formal principles he could 
possibly mean or to detect them in such disparate sub-
ject matter, materials, and contexts. 
In his closing comments on graffiti as "action painting," 
after acknowledging my points that graffiti are pre-
planned and outside the mainstream of art historical tra-
dition, he insists that their motion on subway cars speed-
ing by make them "action painting." While the young men 
who paint graffiti unquestionably enjoy seeing their hand-
iwork speed by, it does not alter the facts that for the New 
York action painters it was the act of painting itself which 
engaged them; it was not the end product or the speed 
with which it was perceived, by them or anyone else. If 
All and sees a connection between the two, it must remain 
his own form of myopia: the analogy remains superficial 
at best. 
Similar errors recur in his protest of my characterization 
of his definition of "good form" as circular. At the very 
least he begs the question on this notion, which is central 
to his thesis, when he writes, "My statement is based on 
empirical findings and not on definitions" (p. 5). To say 
that we have the answers before the question is framed is 
to invite intellectual confusion. 
Art, like "good form," is everywhere, according to 
AI land, its formal principles and aesthetic appeal just 
waiting to be discovered in natural and manmade phe-
nomena by "sensitive individuals." He modestly offers 
himself as a model of such sensitivity, illustrating his re-
sponse with an example of plastic-enclosed buildings on 
a construction site in bad weather. These, he notes, re-
mind him of the "wrapped buildings" of Cristo: Such 
"formally similar phenomena can produce transformative 
reverberations of an aesthetic sort when connections are 
made between them." Cristo's work serves as an example 
of art enriching the "mundane," though Alland confides 
that few laymen know that Cristo's wrappings have 
"aesthetic and political points to make." Here we go 
again. Though I am glad that Cristo has added to AI land's 
heightened sensitivity in the vicinity of construction sites 
in bad weather-is that the point of art? Is it not the 
aesthetic and political points Cristo makes in the act of 
wrapping? Western and other literary traditions have 
been filled with recognition of the capacity to appreciate 
nature and other phenomena unmodified by artists. Jane 
Goodall long ago observed that even chimpanzees en-
joyed the sunset. 
Alland does in the Cristo example what he did in the 
graffiti/de Kooning-Rauschenberg example; he obliter-
ates the significance of the acts and their place in an art 
historical context. This is justified, apparently, because of 
undefined, but underlying formal principles, which es-
cape most laymen though not sensitive individuals like 
himself. 
In his response to my review, AI land gives a far more 
lucid and closely reasoned account of some of the ideas 
which underly The Artistic Animal. Regrettably, this ac-
count is not in the book. My basic criticisms stand: in-
adequate methods and data to support the theory prof-
fered; theory which is incapable of generating testable 
hypotheses; generalizations and conclusions that ex-
ceed the data and theory. 
AI land protests that his grand conception in the tradi-
tion of the psychic unity of mankind has been misinter-
preted. The burden of proof, however, is on the author. It is 
Alland who chooses to put his grand conception on the 
psychic unity of mankind, the origins of art, its biological 
roots, evolutionary development, profusion, and cross-
cultural expression from the paleolithic to airport and 
modern art-and everything in between, including thea-
ter, ritual, dance, and music-into a paperback designed 
for the general public, compressing and juxtaposing 
complex ideas which are not developed. As I originally 
noted in my review, a slight volume can succeed with a 
closely reasoned and elegant argument, which is difficult 
to achieve. Darwin, Freud, and Levi-Strauss, to mention 
others who have been concerned with macroanalysis and 
theory, elaborated their grand conceptions, based on 
empirical data which they collected, in scholarly books of 
a length needed to develop cogent and convincing ar-
guments. Perhaps, AI land will eventually favor us with 
such a volume. 
I agree essentially with AI land that there is a predispo-
siti.on for art in man, and that it is genetically based, 
bemg part of our evolutionary heritage. As I stated in the 
review, our differences concern the extent of the conclu-
sions to be drawn at this time, and in the absence of 
much-needed empirical studies in biology and art. 
Flora S. Kaplan 
